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ABSTRACT 
This paper develops a way of understanding G.E.M. Anscombe’s essay “The First Person”, at the heart 
of which are the following two ideas: first, that the point of her essay is to show that it is not possible 
for anyone to understand what they express with “I” as an Art des Gegebenseins—a way of thinking of 
an object that constitutes identifying knowledge of which object is being thought of; and second, that 
the argument through which her essay seeks to show this is itself first personal in character. 
Understanding Anscombe’s essay in this light has the merit of showing much of what it says to be 
correct.  But it sets us the task of saying what it is that we understand ourselves to express with “I” if 
not an Art des Gegebenseins, and in particular what it is that we understand ourselves to express with 
sentences with “I” as subject that might seem to express identity-judgments, such as “I am NN”, and “I 
am this body”.   
1. G.E.M. Anscombe’s essay “The First Person” is famous for its remark that “‘I’ is neither a
name, nor another kind of expression whose logical role is to make a reference, at all” (1975, 
p. 32).  This remark is widely believed to state an “extraordinary” thesis that no one can
seriously entertain.1  But directly after making this remark Anscombe writes: “Of course we 
must accept the rule ‘If X asserts something with ‘I’ as subject, his assertion will be true if 
and only if what he asserts is true of X’” (1975, p. 32). Whatever she is rejecting, in rejecting 
the idea that “I” is an expression “whose logical role is to make a reference”, she is not 
rejecting this rule.  What, then, is she rejecting?  The aim of this paper is to answer this 
question in a way that enables smooth sense to be made of her essay, and in so doing allows 
the truth of her “extraordinary” remark to be appreciated.  The paper will not give a line-by-
line reading of Anscombe’s essay, but will rather provide an alternative way of 
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communicating the ideas that Anscombe was trying to communicate, with a view to bringing 
out their content, and their truth.2  The paper will fall into four parts.  The first part (in §§2-8) 
will answer the question just raised, and will suggest that understanding the argument of 
Anscombe’s essay requires understanding its argument as itself first personal in character.  
The second part (in §§9-17) will reconstruct its argument in the light of this suggestion about 
its character.  The third part (in §§18-28) will consider a response to the argument, which 
rests on failing to see that it has this character.  And the fourth part (in §§29-35) will present, 
and raise a difficulty, for the understanding of the first person that we are left with at the end 




2.  Fregean orthodoxy has it that, in using a subject-predicate sentence whose subject is a 
singular referring expression, the user knows what it is for a use of the sentence to be true.  
Inter alia, the user knows which object is referred to by the expression in subject-position, 
and as such knows which object a use of the sentence turns on for its truth.  The knowledge 
that the user enjoys, in knowing which object this is, is identifying knowledge.  It is not 
merely general knowledge to the effect that the expression in subject-position refers to 
something that belongs to a certain general kind, or satisfies a certain general description.  It 
is an Art des Gegebenseins—a way of being given an object—which amounts to a way of 
distinguishing the object from everything else.  And it is in this light that Anscombe’s 
“extraordinary” remark is to be understood.  To reject the idea that “I” is an expression whose 
logical role is to make a reference is to reject the idea that a sentence with “I” as subject is a 
sentence whose uses contain this identifying knowledge.  The Fregean orthodoxy has it that, 
in using a sentence of subject-predicate form whose subject is a singular referring expression, 
and so in enjoying identifying knowledge of which object the use of the sentence turns on for 
its truth, the user thinks a singular thought—the singular thought that the use of the sentence 
expresses, on account of its containing this identifying knowledge.  In rejecting the idea that 
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“I” is such an expression, Anscombe is rejecting the idea that a use of a sentence with “I” as 
subject expresses such a thought.  And as such, she is rejecting the idea that, in a use of such a 
sentence, “I” expresses identifying knowledge of which object is being thought of: an Art des 
Gegebenseins—a way of being given an object, or way of thinking of an object—which 
amounts to a way of distinguishing the object being thought of from everything else.  
(Identifying knowledge of which object is being thought of, in a singular thought, just is 
identifying knowledge of which object the use of the sentence which expresses the thought 
turns on for its truth: it is the same knowledge, but described in terms of the thought 
expressed, rather than in terms of what expresses it.) 
 
3.  If this is what Anscombe is rejecting, then it is clear how she can reject the idea that “I” is 
a referring expression, without thereby rejecting the familiar rule.  To reject this idea is to 
hold that no identifying knowledge is internal to any use of a sentence with “I” as subject, and 
as such, that no use of such a sentence expresses a singular thought.  But this does not mean 
that it is not possible to assign conditions of truth to uses of such sentences by means of the 
rule.  Consider someone who uses such a sentence, and call him “NN”.  It is possible to come 
out with an instance of the rule, in the shape of the following sentence: “NN’s assertion of a 
sentence with ‘I’ as subject is true if and only if the predicates that he uses assertively are true 
of NN.”  And identifying knowledge of which object NN’s assertion turns on for its truth is 
internal to the use of this last sentence.  But no such knowledge, and as such no Art des 
Gegebenseins, is internal to NN’s assertion itself.  The fact that NN’s assertion conforms to 
the rule does not entail that NN has the identifying knowledge that might be thought to be 
internal to his use of “I”.  Let it be granted that NN understands the rule, and so knows that 
any assertion of a sentence with “I” as subject turns for its truth on how things stand with the 
one who makes the assertion.  As that is a piece of general knowledge, it does not contain a 
way of being given a particular object, and so it cannot equip NN with any identifying 
knowledge.  A fortiori, it cannot equip NN with the identifying knowledge that his use of “I” 
might be thought to express.  And Anscombe’s point is that there is no such thing as the 
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identifying knowledge expressed by his, or anyone’s use of  “I”.  That is what she means 
when she says that “I” is not an expression whose logical role is to make a reference, at all.     
 
4.  It would be silly to fuss over the word “reference”, or the phrase “referring expression”. 
Suppose that this phrase is understood disjunctively: to mean either a term that expresses an 
Art des Gegebenseins, and as such constitutes identifying knowledge of which object is being 
thought of, or a term that does not express a way of thinking of an object, but may 
nonetheless figure in subject-position in assertions to which conditions of truth may be 
assigned by means of the rule.  Anscombe is not rejecting the idea that “I” is a referring 
expression so understood.  But given what she is rejecting, to argue against her it is not 
enough to show that “I” conforms to the second disjunct of this disjunction.  That is a point 
she brings out in her essay.  She imagines a “logician”—or, as she elsewhere calls him, an 
“insensitive logician” (1976, p. 55)3—for whom it is a sufficient explanation of the meaning 
of “I” that its use conforms to the rule; “the ‘way of being given’ is of no concern to him” 
(1975, p. 29). And she stresses that merely acknowledging the rule does not vindicate her 
fundamental target: the idea that the use of “I” is associated with a distinct “way of being 
given”, which constitutes identifying knowledge.  To argue against her, it is this idea that 
needs to be vindicated.  Gareth Evans sees this.  His work has the great merit of having 
Anscombe’s target squarely in view.  To explain “I” as a referring expression, in the sense 
that is of concern both to him, and to Anscombe, would—as he sees—be to specify “the way 
in which we know, when we think of ourselves [and as such, when we use ‘I’], which object 
is in question” (Evans, 1981, p. 318): it would be to specify the Art des Gegebenseins 
associated with the use of “I”, in such a way as to reveal it to constitute identifying 
knowledge.  And this is what Evans seeks to do.  But it is what much of the literature that 
purports to argue against Anscombe does not so much as try to do—because it does not have 
Anscombe’s target clearly in focus.4  
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5.  And this is not all.  Understanding Anscombe’s essay requires being clear, not only about 
the idea that she is seeking to undermine, but also about the character of the argument through 
which she seeks to undermine it.  Much of the literature that purports to argue against 
Anscombe not only does not have the first clearly in focus; it does not so much as consider 
the second.5  But Anscombe begins her essay by introducing the idea of an argument with “an 
essentially first person character”: for someone to grasp such an argument “he must 
administer it to himself in the first person” (1975, p. 21). And it is a central contention of this 
paper that understanding Anscombe’s argument requires seeing it to share this character.     
 
6.  As an example of an argument with this character, Anscombe considers (what she calls) 
the “corollary argument” to Descartes’ cogito. For someone to endorse this argument is for 
him to assert: “I am not a body”—and in so doing to take himself at once to think of an object 
in the act of using “I”, and to judge of this object that it is not a body. Indeed, as Anscombe 
notes, if “Descartes” is taken as the name of a body (“that Frenchman, born of such-and-such 
a stock, and christened René” (1975, p. 21)) he must equally assert: “I am not Descartes”; and 
the same goes for any name with this character that takes the place of “b” in the schema “I am 
not b”.  In general, someone who endorses this argument must take himself, in asserting 
something of the form “I am b”, to express an identity-judgment: a judgment composed of the 
way of thinking he expresses with “I”, which affords identifying knowledge of which object 
is being thereby thought of, and the way of thinking he expresses with “b”, which affords 
identifying knowledge of which object is being thereby thought of, whose truth entails that 
the object thought of in the first way is identical to the object thought of in the second.  And 
he must hold that, if “b” is the name of a body, then this judgment is false.   
 
7.  “Well, he is right on the first of these points—but wrong on the second.”  That is likely to 
be the majority view amongst contemporary philosophers who self-advertise as anti-
Cartesian.  But for Anscombe this view is not anti-Cartesian enough.  For the truth is that he 
is wrong on the first point (and so neither right nor wrong on the second): he is wrong to take 
	 6 
himself to be expressing an identity-judgment in asserting something of the form “I am b”—
because he is wrong to take himself to be thinking of an object in using “I”.  That is what 
Anscombe seeks to establish.  And because her target partakes of an “essentially first-person 
character”—as the use of the phrase “take himself” in its specification shows—her own 
argument against this target must equally possess this character.  That it does is our guiding 
principle here.  As with Descartes’ argument, for someone to grasp her argument “he must 
administer it to himself in the first person”.  
 
8.  To bring this out, we shall consider someone who does this.  He could be anyone.  We 
shall call him “NN”.  We shall consider NN asking the questions that Anscombe asks, and 
answering them in a manner that matches her own—all “in the first person”. Our approach 
will not be that of a theorist: thinking of him, and asking questions about him.  It will be more 
like that of the reader of a novel: going on a journey with him, as he asks these questions of 
himself.  We shall not be asking how exactly it is that he thinks of an object, in using “I” and 
its cognates; we shall rather be considering him asking: “How exactly is it that I think of an 
object, in using ‘I’ and its cognates?” As it might be put: we shall not be seeking to articulate 
an understanding that happens to concern NN, but shall rather be considering NN seeking to 
articulate self-understanding.  We shall often be in the third person.  But we must bear in 
mind that the pronoun “he” which figures in the specifications of the thoughts that we shall 
ascribe to NN is that special pronoun to which Hector-Neri Castañeda awarded a star 
(Castañeda, 1966). This means that when we say, for example, that NN assumes that he 
expresses an Art des Gegebenseins, or that NN desires to specify what he expresses with “I”, 
what we are saying is that he assumes (as he would put it) “I express an Art des 
Gegebenseins”, or that he desires (as he would put it) “to specify what I express with ‘I’”.  
Rather than littering the text with this device—which is likely to generate obscurity (as well 





9.  NN is a Fregean.  He assumes that in using “I”, or a cognate expression (such as “me” or 
“myself”), he expresses an Art des Gegebenseins.  But he is curious.  He wants to understand 
this—he wants some sort of specification of what he expresses, in using “I”, which makes it 
clear to him that this is a way of thinking of an object.  And he has a certain conception of 
what it would be for him to do this.  He takes it for granted that thinking of an object is a 
matter of knowing which object he thinks of: he has a conception of a totality of objects, and 
he takes it for granted that in thinking of one of these he exercises some way of distinguishing 
the object he thinks of from all others.  His desire, then, is to specify what he expresses with 
“I” in such a way as to make it clear to him that it affords identifying knowledge of which 
object he thinks of, when he thinks something that he expresses with this, or a cognate 
expression.  And this is surely not a recherché desire.  A common reaction for at least some 
people to have, on being confronted with Anscombe’s remark that the logical role of “I” is 
not to make a reference, is to say (perhaps a little exasperatedly): “Of course ‘I’ refers!  On 
my lips, it refers to me.”  And as the one who says this says “me”, he will accompany his 
utterance with a pointing gesture—the base of his finger facing away from him, and its tip 
facing towards him.  It is not unnatural to think that this gesture is intended to constitute an 
act of picking out, from the totality of objects, the object that he is thinking of in using “I”, 
and in so doing to manifest identifying knowledge of which object this is.  
 
10.  NN thinks that he can understand what he expresses with a proper name as constituting 
knowledge of this sort.  So, he begins by attempting to treat what he expresses with “I” as a 
species of the generic way of thinking that he expresses with proper names.  That requires 
understanding what he expresses as involving some conception of the sort of thing that he 
thinks of in using “I”. And this seems clear to him: he thinks of a body—“a spatial and 
temporal, perishable and divisible substance” (Rödl, 2007, p. 127), something that is such as 
to be given to ordinary sensory consciousness (visual consciousness, for instance).   And not 
only that: he thinks of a specific kind of body, one of those about which he has come “to learn 
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that it is a human being” (Anscombe, 1975, p. 34).  (In what follows, the variable expression 
“someone” will be used to signify some body about which it is possible “to learn that it is a 
human being”.6)       
 
11. But this cannot be right—as NN can see.  As NN sees it, a proper name is attached to an 
object through the object’s being given to sensory consciousness.  And in general, how 
objects are given to sensory consciousness is expressible by uses of demonstratives: by a use 
of “This human being”, for example.  To attach a name to an object in this manner is to refer 
to the object through a demonstrative, and in so doing to say of a name that it refers to the 
demonstrated object—by coming out with something on the lines of: “‘NN’ refers to this 
human being”, for example.  But merely coming out with something on these lines is not 
sufficient for attaching the name.  Actually attaching a name presupposes the capacity, not 
merely to make a demonstrative reference to an object at one time, but to identify the same 
object again at later times.  And, as NN sees, this capacity is fallible, in that it is vulnerable to 
a certain kind of error.  It is possible to take someone given at a certain time to be NN, but be 
wrong—because he is not NN.  (This might happen because the one given looks like NN, even 
though he is not.)  As it might be put: the capacity to use a name is vulnerable to errors of 
identification.  And, as NN sees, the same cannot be true of the capacity to use “I”.  NN is 
prepared to concede that there might be a class of exercises of this capacity that are 
vulnerable to errors of this kind, on account of their uniting “I” with a predicate from a certain 
class, and as such having a certain kind of epistemic basis.  The predicates in this class fix it 
that exercises of the capacity involving these predicates are based on identity-judgments 
expressible by the use of sentences with “I” as subject.  For example, someone falsely asserts: 
“I look F”, on the basis of seeing someone who looks F and making the false identity-
judgment (as she would put it) “I am that one”; and because her assertion is based on a false 
identity-judgment, it is possible to say that she falsely takes the one that she thinks of in 
making this assertion to be (as she would put it) “myself”. But this case contains the idea of 
an exercise of the capacity to use “I” that is not based on an identity-judgment—in the shape 
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of the exercise of this capacity that figures in the expression of the identity-judgment in this 
case.  The capacity to use “I” may be said to divide into two capacities: first, the capacity to 
use “I” together with something other than a predicate from this class, and as such not on the 
basis of an identity-judgment; and second, the capacity to use “I” together with a predicate 
from this class, and as such on the basis of an identity-judgment expressible by the use of a 
sentence with “I” as subject.  And the first capacity is not vulnerable to errors of 
identification.  On the basis of these reflections, NN concludes that “I” cannot refer in the 
manner of a proper name—because if it did refer in this manner, then the capacity to use “I” 
would not divide into these two capacities: the capacity to use “I” together with anything 
would be vulnerable to errors of this kind, just as the capacity to use “NN” together with 
anything is vulnerable to such errors.   
 
12.  NN’s attempt to self-understand what he expresses with “I” as an Art des Gegebenseins 
seems to have run into the ground. He is briefly tempted to drop the idea that led to the 
present difficulty—the idea of a capacity to identify the same again over time.  But he soon 
sees that what he expresses with “I” cannot simply be a way of thinking of someone who is 
present to sensory consciousness at some time, whoever it happens to be—for then it could be 
a matter of thinking of someone other than (as he would put it) “myself”.  (That would seem 
to be the generic way of thinking associated with the demonstrative expression “That human 
being”, itself a species of the generic way of thinking associated with demonstratives—a 
genus that may be characterized simply as a way of thinking of something through its 
presence to sensory consciousness.)7 
 
13.  Perhaps, however, there is life in his attempt yet.  One further difficulty that might seem 
to stymie it is that it seems that he could still use “I” even if he were in the kind of situation 
envisaged by the Cartesian “dreaming” skeptic—undergoing a series of hallucinations across 
all of the ordinary sensory modalities, and as such not having anything present to his ordinary 
sensory consciousness at all: even in such a case it seems that he is still thinking something 
	 10 
that he could express by using “I”—by saying “I seem to see something” (for example).  But 
he is not sure that this is a real difficulty.  For why could not something of the right sort be 
present to consciousness even then?  That would mean two things: first, the relevant mode of 
presence cannot be the one that makes bodies present—call it “outer” presence; and second, 
the relevant conception of what he thinks of cannot be that of a human being, or of any kind 
of body at all.  The presence—call it “inner” presence—would have to be possible even when 
there is no “outer” presence, but merely an instance of thinking something.  But then “what 
conception can be suggested”, of what he thinks of in this case, “other than that of thinking” 
(Anscombe, 1975, p. 29)—for what could be present in this case, other than an instance of 
thinking?  It seems that what is thought of cannot be a body, but something whose nature 
consists solely in thinking—a Cartesian Ego.  This is not what NN initially hoped for, but it 
might at least seem to avoid the vulnerability to error through misidentification that afflicted 
his attempt when it was understood in terms of “outer” rather than “inner” presence.   
 
14.  But how can it avoid this?  As far as NN can see, the only way to single out an instance of 
thinking through its “presence to consciousness” (Anscombe, 1975, p. 30) is by employing 
the generic way of thinking associated with demonstratives, alighting on one of the objects of 
“inner” presence, and stipulating: “‘I’ stands for this thinking”.  NN’s hope is that he will 
thereby set up a way of thinking associated with “I”.  But as Anscombe sees, this position 
faces “the intolerable difficulty of requiring an identification of the same referent in different 
‘I’-thoughts” (1975, p. 31). The difficulty is apt to come into focus as a problem about how to 
recognize the same instance of thinking across time.  The instance of thinking that was 
present at an earlier time could leave behind a trace in the memory; but even if the instance of 
thinking that is present at a later time is sensibly the same as the trace that is equally present 
at this time, that is no guarantee of real sameness: despite there being no sensible quality 
which the former does not share with the latter, the instance of thinking that is present at the 
later time might still be different from the instance of thinking that the trace presents.  So, the 
possibility of identification-error opens up: the thinking present at the later time could be 
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taken to be (as NN would put it) “myself” even though it is not.  But the problem is that NN 
has no idea how to go about identifying the same instance of thinking at a later time.  And this 
suggests that the difficulty lies at a deeper level.  The very idea of misidentifying an instance 
of thinking rests on the idea of an instance of thinking that is capable of persisting over time 
but happens to be replaced by a different persisting instance of thinking that in some way 
matches the first at the level of sensible appearance.  But it is not clear that the idea of 
thinking has the substance to provide for the idea of instances that persist over time at all.8 
What is there in the idea of thinking to provide for the idea that an instance of thinking at one 
time, and an instance of thinking at another time are the same instance of thinking?  It is 
tempting to say that they are same just in case they are “in” the same thinker.  But this answer 
is precluded, because in the present Cartesian context the very idea of a thinker is itself being 
explained in terms of the idea of an instance of thinking.  It might be tempting to say that they 
are the same just in case they have the same content.  But this answer is equally precluded, 
insofar as it must be possible for a single thinker to think different things at different times, 
and so, in the present Cartesian context, insofar as it must be possible for a single instance of 
thinking to admit of different contents at different times.  Short of these answers, it is hard to 
see how to understand the idea of an instance of thinking as the idea of something that is 
capable of being the same at different times; it is hard to see how to understand it as the idea 
of a substance (in the sense of something that is capable of such temporally extended 
sameness).  
 
15.  According to Anscombe, it was this difficulty that “led Russell at one point to speak of 
‘short-term selves’” (1975, p. 31).  And because NN sees the difficulty here, it briefly seems 
to him that the only way to avoid it is to insist that “‘I’ [be] freshly defined with each use” 
(Anscombe, 1975, p. 30): by stipulating on each occasion of use that “I” stands for whatever 
instance of thinking is present at the time.  But soon even this seems doubtful.  For it is not 
clear to NN that he has any idea how to go about getting hold of an instance of thinking 
through its presence to sensory consciousness.  How can it be that when he speaks of “this 
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thinking” he gets hold of just one instance of thinking?  Why could he not be getting hold of 
many, “thinking in unison”?  As Anscombe memorably puts the point: when the possessed 
man in the Gospel says “Legion, for we are many”, perhaps that should be taken “solemnly, 
not as a grammatical joke” (1975, p. 31).  These questions show the confusion NN is in.  And 
the source of his confusion is the same as before:  insofar as the idea of thinking lacks the 
substance to provide for the idea of instances that persist over time, it is not clear that it has 
the substance to provide for the idea of instances of thinking as objects of singular 
demonstrative reference at all.   
 
16.  And with that, NN concludes that his attempt has failed.  He cannot make sense of what 
“I” expresses as a way of thinking of something that is present to consciousness, be it a 
human being, or a “Cartesian Ego”.  He starts to suspect that the culprit here is the very idea 
of what is present to consciousness, and that the governing idea must be the idea, not of what 
is present, but of what presentations are made to: not of what is in front of, but of what is 
behind the lens.  But what is that, and how does he think of it?  He is now tempted to come 
out with the following.  “It is simply: me; myself; I—the subject.  It cannot be something that 
I think of in the manner described and rejected above (in §§9-15). In this sense, it cannot be in 
the world at all.  ‘It [is] not to be found.  It [is] rather as it were an area of darkness from 
which light [shines] on everything else’ (Anscombe, 1975, p. 32). I am not an object, in the 
sense of something presented, something that is in the world.  I am the subject.”9  In coming 
out with this, he is trying to preserve the minimal idea of “I” as expressing an Art des 
Gegebenseins, even in the teeth of his inability to make sense of this.  But it is not long before 
he starts to have doubts.  He has failed to specify how he thinks of (what he wants to call) 
“the subject”.  And he is not sure whether he is speaking of anything at all, in speaking of 




17.  Barred from appealing to an account of the sort canvassed in §§9-15 above, he really has 
no idea how he thinks of an object in using “I”.  He cannot understand what he expresses with 
“I” as an Art des Gegebenseins.  So, he has a choice: either hold on to the orthodoxy and start 
to come out with the only dubiously intelligible stuff that he came out with in §16; or 
abandon the orthodoxy that he has tried but failed to make sense of, and seek to articulate an 




18.  Before we continue with the story, it is worth considering an attempt to defuse the 
present difficulties: by adopting the perspective of a theorist (mentioned in §8).  We can think 
of NN, and ask how it is that he thinks of an object in what he expresses with “I”.  And 
perhaps we can answer this question from this perspective.  Perhaps we can explain how NN 
gets hold of what is (as he is tempted to put it) “behind the lens”, by going behind his back.   
 
19.  Any attempt to give an account from this vantage point might begin with Anscombe’s 
rule: “If X asserts something with ‘I’ as subject, his assertion will be true if and only if what 
he asserts is true of X”.  That might seem to point to a similar rule that holds at the level of 
thought: if someone thinks in the manner expressible by a first person pronoun, then he thinks 
in a manner that fixes it that he thinks of himself.  Once we have this second rule, it is easy to 
bring NN under it.  And that is because, in the case of what we express with “NN”, we have 
exactly what NN does not have in the case of what he expresses with “I”, but does have in the 
case of what he expresses with “NN”: a specification of what is expressed, which makes it 
clear that this is a way of thinking of an object that constitutes identifying knowledge of 
which object is being thought of—in the shape of a specification of the sort considered in 
§§10-11, which does not work for what is expressed by “I”, but is fine for the case of what is 
expressed by a proper name.  Through bringing what we express with “NN” together with this 
rule, we can bring the object that we thereby think of under the rule.  We can say this: “NN 
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thinks of himself”.  (More fully: “If NN thinks in the manner that he would express with “I”, 
then he expresses a way of thinking that fixes it that he thinks of himself”.)  And once we 
have brought NN under the rule, in this manner, it might seem that we have an account which 
can enable NN to understand not only that what he expresses with “I” is a way of thinking of 
an object, but also which object this is.  
 
20.  But this is not right.  No account given from a theorist’s perspective can hope to equip 
NN with this understanding, because it cannot hope to express the way of thinking of an 
object that it says that NN expresses with “I”.  An account given from this perspective can say 
that NN expresses a way of thinking of himself.  That seems to get hold of the right object—
but it does not express the putative way of thinking of this object that it mentions.10  As 
Anscombe puts it: “through the peculiarity of our construction, we have succeeded in 
specifying an object (by means of the subject of our sentence) without specifying [how NN’s] 
mind is supposed to latch on to it” (1975, p. 23).  The way of thinking that we express with 
the subject of our sentence “NN expresses a way of thinking of himself”—that is, with 
“NN”—is not the way of thinking at issue; and because the object of our sentence is merely 
the ordinary reflexive (“himself”), to the extent that we express any way of thinking with the 
object of our sentence it can only be the very one we express with the subject.  Of course, we 
can say that what NN expresses, in using “I”, is not the way of thinking that anyone can 
express with “NN”, but the way of thinking that NN would express with “I”.  But to say that is 
not to express the (putative) way of thinking that NN wants to understand.  If there is such a 
thing as the way of thinking of an object that NN expresses with “I”, then it cannot be 
expressed from this perspective: from here it must remain dark, in a black box, as the 
quotation marks around “I” serve to convey.  And for this reason, no account given from this 
perspective can help NN in his quest.  NN’s topic, introduced in §9, is (as he would put it) 
“what I express with ‘I’”.  His topic is not simply something that he can speak of; it is—
fundamentally—something that he can, and does express.  His aim is to give a further 
specification of what he expresses, and in so doing to make it clear that this is a way of 
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thinking of an object, which constitutes identifying knowledge of which object is being 
thought of.  The reason why an account given from a theorist’s perspective cannot be of any 
use to NN is that it is incapable of expressing this way of thinking.  As it might be put: 
because NN seeks self-understanding, he seeks an account of his topic from its own 
standpoint—an account that expresses the topic, and then proceeds to specify it further.  And 
no account given from a theorist’s perspective can express the topic.  So, no account given 
from there can be an account of the topic from its own standpoint—and as such, it cannot be 
of any use when it comes to equipping NN with the understanding that he is looking for. 
 
21.  There are places in philosophy where this last point seems to surface.  Gareth Evans 
chastises accounts that fail to specify “the way in which we know, when we think of 
ourselves, which object is in question” (1981, p. 318).  It seems to matter that Evans describes 
what is missing in the first person.  It suggests that the account of the way of knowing that he 
goes on to give is meant to enable someone—such as NN—to acquire self-understanding, by 
enabling him to understand what he expresses with “I” as a way of thinking of an object that 
constitutes knowledge of which object is being thought of.  But it does not do this.  And as we 
shall see, it is not clear that it is meant to do this at all.  
 
22.  Evans begins with the idea of an assertion of a sentence with subject-predicate structure 
whose subject is “I”—what he calls “a self-ascription”.  He goes on to distinguish between 
mental and bodily self-ascription.  On the bodily side, Evans mentions two ways of knowing: 
through “proprioception”, and through “perception”.  Each seems to be a mode of presence to 
consciousness, and as such incapable of revealing what “I” expresses to be an Art des 
Gegebenseins, for the reasons given in §§9-15.11  On the mental side, he mentions one: 
through some form of reasoning; through judging p as a result of theoretical reasoning the 
judging subject knows (as he would put it) “I believe p”, for example.12  But that cannot 
explain “I”, on the subject’s lips, as not purely formal—it cannot explain it as a device that 
expresses a way of thinking of an object.  Evans sees this: he notes that without a suitable 
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background “we secure no genuine ‘I think’ (‘think p’) to accompany his thought (‘p’): the ‘I 
think’ which accompanies all his thoughts is purely formal” (1982, p. 226).  This background 
must include an account of how uses of “I” get hold of an object, and it seems that the ways 
of thinking (and so, of knowing which object is being thought of) that underwrite bodily self-
ascriptions are to supply this.  The problem is that they cannot, for the reasons given in §§9-
15.   
 
23.  It looks as if Evans’ account fails to do what it is meant to do.  But perhaps it was never 
meant to do this.  Notice what Evans has just said: “we secure no genuine ‘I think’ … to 
accompany his thought” (my emphasis).  That suggests that his account comes from the 
perspective of a theorist: its question is not whether someone can understand what he 
expresses with “I” as an Art des Gegebenseins, but whether we can describe “I” on his lips as 
expressing a way of thinking of an object (just as we did in §19 above, when we said that if 
someone thinks in the manner expressible by the first person, then he thinks in a manner that 
fixes it that he thinks of himself).  If this is right, then his account is not meant to enable 
someone to acquire the kind of self-understanding sought for by NN.13 
 
24.  Evans seems to think that for someone’s use of “I” to be governed by a rule such as 
Anscombe’s is for him to actualize a certain intention: an intention to satisfy the one-place 
concept-expression “ξ thinks of ξ”.  This supports the suggestion that Evans’ account was 
never meant to enable someone to acquire the kind of self-understanding sought for by NN.  
Suppose that NN self-ascribes this intention—by saying (as he would put it) “I intend to 
satisfy the one-place concept-expression ‘ξ thinks of ξ’”— and in so doing understands that 
this is what he is doing.  He can only understand the actualization of the intention that he 
thereby self-ascribes to constitute a case of thinking of a specific object (and, as such, of 
knowing which object this is) if he can take himself to know not just that he thinks of a 
specific object in using “I”, but which object this is.  And as yet he cannot take himself to 
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know these things—that was the upshot of the foregoing discussion.  So, NN cannot attain the 
self-understanding that he seeks—one that makes it clear to him that, in using “I”, he thinks 
of an object, and knows which object this is—through self-ascribing this intention in the 
understanding that this is what he is doing.  Perhaps a theorist could attain the very different 
understanding that interests him through ascribing this intention to NN, in the understanding 
that this is what he (the theorist) is doing: as the theorist already thinks of someone in the way 
associated with the name “NN”, and knows which object this is, ascribing this intention to NN 
will enable him to know not merely that NN thinks of an object in using “I”, but which object 
this is—namely, NN.  But this is not the understanding that NN is looking for.  Far from being 
an alternative to an understanding that is given from a theorist’s perspective, it seems that 
Evans’ account is an example of such an understanding—and consequently of no use to 
someone who seeks self-understanding of the present sort. 
 
25.  Evans seems to be conflicted as to whether his aim is to provide for speakers to have this 
self-understanding.  Alongside the remarks cited in §21, he insists that the way of thinking 
that a speaker expresses with “I”—what Evans calls the speaker’s “Idea” of himself—“must 
comprise … a knowledge of what it would be for an identity of the form [I= δt] to be true, 
where “δt” expresses a fundamental identification of a person: an identification of a person 
which—unlike [the speaker’s] ‘I’ identification—is of a kind which could be available to 
someone else” (1982, p. 209).14 That suggests that Evans is at least concerned with this self-
understanding, for (as he realizes) if a speaker is to know what it is for an identity of the form 
[I=δt] to be true, the speaker needs to understand what he expresses with “I” as constituting 
knowledge of which object is being thought of—because only then can he understand what it 
is for what he expresses with a sentence with “I” as subject to be true; and only then can he 
understand what it is for a judgment of the form [I=δt] to be true. The problem is that this is an 
understanding that Evans has not provided for, and that it seems that no one can have.  
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26.  Evans is uncharacteristically tentative about what his account achieves: he describes it as 
“only the most preliminary approach to this difficult subject” (1982, p. 255).  Evans’ early 
death meant that he never managed to complete a final draft of the book (The Varieties of 
Reference) in which his account appears.  And in his comments on the chapter in which it 
appears, the book’s editor, John McDowell, remarks that Evans came to think that the account 
was not “sufficient on its own to settle worries, like [Thomas] Nagel’s, about the possibility 
of identifying oneself with … an element of the objective order” (1982, p. 265).  It is a worry 
of just this sort that is at issue here.  Nagel begins as NN did in §10: with the idea of 
something referred to in the manner associated with a proper name.  And he soon becomes 
mystified as to how what he gets hold of with “I” can be identical to anything of that kind.15  
As Nagel puts it: “I may … see the world through the eyes of TN, but I can’t be TN” (1986, 
p. 55).  (Is he afraid, or in ecstasy?)  Nagel is at the stage at which NN found himself in §16: 
unable to make sense of how “I” expresses a way of thinking of an object, and yet still 
convinced that “I” expresses a way of thinking of (as he would put it) “me”.  Just like NN, 
Nagel feels the temptation to say: “I am not an object, I am not something in the world; I am 
the subject”.  And because he thinks that TN is something in the world, he is thereby assailed 
by the temptation to say: “I can’t be TN”.  Anscombe would not deny that Nagel’s worry 
embodies an insight.  And yet she would think that it is an example of (what she calls) 
“raving”.  After considering the temptation to come out with something on the lines of “I am 
not an object; I am the subject”, Anscombe makes the following remark: “So long we adhere 
to the [assumption] that ‘I’ is a referring expression … you will get the deep division between 
those whose considerations show that they have not perceived the difficulty—for them ‘I’ is 
in principle no different from my ‘A’; and those who would—or do—perceive the difference 
and are led to rave in consequence” (1975, p. 32).  Anscombe’s “A” is a device that she 
introduces to bring out a problem with an explanation of the meaning of “I” that simply says 
that its use conforms to her rule.  She invites us imagine the following scenario.  There is a 
manifold of twenty-four speakers, each of which has a name that is not shared by any other 
member of the manifold.  These names are the letters of the alphabet from “B” to “C”.  And 
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each one of these names refers to its bearer in the way associated with proper names, 
described in §11.  But in addition to their names, each speaker also uses a device, “A”, which 
refers to its speaker in the way associated with proper names.  As “A” refers to its speaker, it 
follows that its use conforms to the rule for “I”.  But as “A” refers in the manner of a proper 
name, it follows that it cannot be a version of “I”—for the reasons given in §11.  Anscombe 
says that the idea of self-consciousness is the idea of “what is manifested by the use of ‘I’ as 
opposed to ‘A’” (1975, p. 25).  And it is for this reason that she says that her description of 
this manifold of speakers “does not include self-consciousness” on their part.  This absence of 
an inclusion of self-consciousness is reflected in the fact that, when we are asked to consider 
her “A”, we are asked to do so, not from within the self-consciousness of its users—for all 
that Anscombe has said, they do not have any—but from the perspective of a theorist.  It is 
because Nagel proceeds entirely from within self-consciousness that he can perceive the 
difficulties. In this respect he is just like NN.  And just like NN in §16, he is led to rave.  For 
him to settle his worries, he would need to understand, from within, how it is that in using “I” 
he gets hold of “an element of the objective order”.  He would need the kind of understanding 
that Anscombe enjoins us to make sense of, and that NN seeks.  McDowell’s remarks suggest 
that Evans had come to see that the account he had given was not sufficient to supply this 
understanding.     
 
27.  Nagel’s raving is not unique to him.  Philosophers and others humanistic thinkers are apt 
to engage in it: we find it (for example) in Musil, in Schopenhauer, in Thoreau, in at least a 
persona of Wittgenstein’s—and of course in NN.16  All assume that if they were to make an 
assertion with “I” as subject of the form “I am b” then they would express an identity-
judgment—and, like Nagel, they are mystified as to how this judgment can be true when “b” 
names something given to the senses.  Being able to see how mystifying this identity 
judgment would be if it were genuine is a mark of humanism—for it is a consequence of 
proceeding from within; whereas, being unable to see any mystery here is a mark of 
scientism—for it is a consequence of proceeding from the external perspective of a theorist.  
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Understanding Anscombe’s argument requires being a humanist, for it requires proceeding 
from within self-consciousness.  But to endorse the conclusion of her argument is, not to rave, 
but to recognize that “‘I’ is neither a name nor another kind of expression whose logical role 
is to make a reference, at all”.  
 
28.  It is not only Anscombe who refuses to rave.  Nor, finally, does NN.  He tried to 
understand what he expresses with “I” as an Art des Gegenbenseins—and we saw his failure 
to do so in §§9-17. That part of the story ended with NN recognizing his failure, and in its 
light abandoning the Fregean orthodoxy that he was trying to make sense of.   And with this 




29.  NN cannot see how to endorse the Fregean orthodoxy.  But what is the alternative?  He 
tries to answer this question by focusing on self-ascriptions: assertions of subject-predicate 
sentences with “I” as subject, which express self-consciousness. For the orthodoxy, a self-
ascription is the expression of a singular thought whose subject-component is an Art des 
Gegebenseins associated with “I”; for example, “I am opening a window” expresses a 
singular thought that identifies someone in some way, and says of him that he is doing 
something.  But, as NN can see, if a self-ascription was the expression of such a thought, then 
its content would have to get hold of its object in one of the ways described in §§9-12—either 
in the manner of a proper name, or in the manner of a demonstrative—and then it would not 
be an expression of self-consciousness, and so not a self-ascription.   
 
30.  This affords a negative characterization of self-ascription.  It is not the expression of a 
thought the subject-component of which gets hold of an object in one of the ways specified in 
§§9-12. As a self-ascription, it expresses self-consciousness, but self-consciousness neither is, 
nor contains, an Art des Gegebenseins—on the contrary, it is (minimally) what is expressed 
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with “I”, insofar as what is expressed with “I” does not amount to a way of thinking of an 
object at all.  And for this reason—paradoxical as it may sound—a self-ascription is not a 
kind of ascription, insofar as an ascription is an assertion that expresses a singular thought.  
 
31.  This is not to deny that assertions of subject-predicate sentences with “I” as subject fall 
under Anscombe’s rule.  So, there is nothing here to unsettle the familiar inferential profile of 
these assertions.  NN can grant that if someone asserts “I am opening the window” then his 
assertion is true just in case what he asserts is true of him.  So characterized, this assertion 
might be an expression of self-consciousness; but equally it might not be, for it is consistent 
with its falling under the rule that it deploys “I” as a demonstrative, or as a name—that is, as a 
device that expresses a way of thinking that exemplifies one of the manners of thinking 
described in §§9-12.17  Then it would express a bona fide singular thought—and so, it would 
not be a self-ascription.  By contrast, if the assertion is a genuine self-ascription, then it does 
not serve to identify someone, and to ascribe the predicate “opening the window” to him.  The 
assertion is true just in case the one who makes it satisfies this predicate.  But—unlike when 
the assertion expresses a singular thought—a way of thinking of the one in question is no part 
of what it expresses.  
 
32.  As NN acknowledges this, he sees that the assertion “I am NN” is itself merely an 
assertion that falls under a rule of language that parallels Anscombe’s rule: if someone asserts 
something with “I” as subject of the form “I am b” then his assertion is true just in case he is 
identical to b.  The raver in NN wants to say more: that when he makes this assertion he 
expresses an identity-judgment in which he thinks of (as he wants to say) “myself”, and says 
of the one he thereby identifies that he is NN.  But he can see that there is nothing more to 
say.  The assertion is true just in case the one who makes it is NN.  And as before, a way of 
thinking of the one in question is no part of its content.    
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33.  Anscombe’s discussion of assertions of the form “I am b” is the only section of her essay 
that is consistently written in the first person.  And it seems that this is because, in this 
section, she is exploiting (what we might call) the addressing function of “I”: its role of 
indicating something to another—namely, which one it is upon which the assertion turns for 
its truth.18  Her first personal mode of expression can make it look as if in making assertions 
such as “I am EA”, or “I am this body here” she is thinking of (as she would put it) “myself”, 
and implying something about the one thereby identified (minimally, that the truth of their 
assertions turn on how things stand with EA, or with “this body here”).19  But this cannot be 
how Anscombe sees things.  The assertions conform to the rule of language introduced in 
§32, but that is all.   
 
34.  That is her position, and she captures it by saying that “I” is not a referring expression.  
In saying this, Anscombe is not denying her rule, or the parallel rule described in §32.  But 
she is denying that assertions with “I” as subject contain identifying knowledge of which 
object is being thought of.  And in denying this, she leaves us with a task.   
 
35.  Back in §9, it was noted that a common reaction for at least certain people to have on 
being confronted with Anscombe’s remark that “I” is not a referring expression is to say 
(something like): “When I use ‘I’, it refers to me”.  As the one who says this says “me”, he 
will accompany his utterance with a pointing gesture—the base of his finger facing away 
from him, and its tip facing towards him; and it is not unnatural to take him to understand his 
gesture as manifesting the identifying knowledge that is contained in the way of thinking that 
he expresses with “I”.  In this paper, we have considered someone who took this 
understanding for granted, called him “NN”, and followed him as he tried to make sense of 
what he expresses with “I”: first, as a way of thinking of a human being (§§10-12); and when 
that failed, as a way of thinking of a Cartesian Ego (§§13-16)—and when that failed, we 
watched him degenerate into raving (§17).  The moral that NN draws from his progress is that 
what he expresses with “I” is not an Art des Gegebenseins at all.  And that is the moral that 
	 23 
Anscombe wants everyone to draw.  Anscombe need not deny that the pointing gesture 
manifests identifying knowledge; but she would insist that this is knowledge contained in 
what is expressed by the demonstrative expression “this body”, or “this human being”, rather 
than in what is expressed by “I”.  However, Anscombe does want to insist that someone who 
makes this gesture can know (as he would put it) “I am this body”.  And on the face of it, this 
is puzzling, for what he expresses in those words does seem to be an identity-judgment—and 
yet, it cannot be this if what he expresses with “I” does not constitute identifying knowledge.  
Anscombe, of course, insists that it is not an identity-judgment.  But that does not make the 
puzzle go away—it compounds it.  No identifying knowledge is internal to any use of “I”.  
But then it seems that, from the standpoint of what is internal to a use of “I”, what “I” 
expresses does not concern anyone at all.  Of course, it is possible from outside of this 
standpoint to assign a truth condition to a use of a sentence with “I” as subject, by means of 
Anscombe’s rule, and in this light to count the use of the sentence as concerning the one who 
figures as the referent of the device in subject-position in the specification of this condition.  
But that is to proceed from the external perspective of a theorist; from the standpoint of the 
self-consciousness that is internal to the use of “I”, what “I” expresses does not concern 
anyone at all.  Or so it seems.  But then it is a real question what sense can be made, from this 
standpoint, of what is expressed by a sentence such as “I am this body”, or “I am NN”.  It 
seems that whatever is in view from this standpoint is an essential aspect of what it is for 
anyone to understand himself as a body—indeed, as a human being—at all.  But what could 
this understanding come to, if Anscombe is right that “‘I’ is neither a name nor another kind 
of expression whose logical role is to make a reference, at all”?  It is, I think, because Evans 
saw the difficulty of this question that he thought that Anscombe must be wrong about “I”.  
But she is not wrong.  So, the question remains.  The task that her essay sets us is to 
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1 For “extraordinary”, see Evans, 1982, p. 214.    
2 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this description of what the paper is trying to do.  
3 Anscombe, 1976, p. 55.  (This is a very important essay for understanding Anscombe’s 
work on “I”.)      
4 For two recent examples, see Rumfitt, 1994 and O’Brien, 1994.  Rumfitt is explicitly not 
trying to show that a use of a sentence with “I” as subject contains identifying knowledge of 
which object is being referred to.  As he puts it: although a use of such a sentence is 
constituted by the speaker’s “intention to refer to himself”, in forming this intention the 
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speaker “need not form an intention to refer to such and such, where the speaker could (if 
called upon to do so) pick out such and such from among its own kind” (1994, p. 635).  If the 
actualization of the speaker’s intention contained identifying knowledge of which object is 
being referred to, then the speaker could pick out the object in just this way.  As it does not, 
and as the speaker’s use of a sentence with “I” as subject is constituted by the actualization of 
this intention, so this use equally does not contain this knowledge.  By Rumfitt’s own lights, 
“I” is not a referring expression, in the sense that interests Anscombe.  O’Brien’s position, by 
contrast, is closer to that of Evans.  She thinks that for “I” to be used as a device of (what she 
calls) “self-conscious self-reference”, the speaker must use “I” in the knowledge that (as he 
would put it) “I am using ‘I’”; and she thinks that this knowledge must contain an Art des 
Gegebenseins, and as such must contain identifying knowledge, associated with the speaker’s 
use of “I”.  As O’Brien puts it: “our capacity to use ‘I’ as expressive of self-conscious self-
reference rests on an, as yet unexplained, prior first personal identification of ourselves in 
thought” (1994, p. 280).  But O’Brien does not think that Anscombe’s argument is directed 
against the very idea of such a “first personal identification … in thought”.  On the contrary: 
O’Brien thinks that understanding what (if anything) this identification comes to is the task 
that “Anscombe’s arguments seem to leave us with” (1994, p. 281).  But that was her task all 
along.  O’Brien seems to think that Anscombe’s target is an idea that holds at the level of 
language, but not at the level of thought.  But there is nothing in Anscombe’s essay (or in her 
work more generally) to suggest that she is operating with this distinction.  To suppose that 
“I” is a referring expression, in the sense that interests Anscombe, is to suppose that “I” 
expresses a way of thinking of an object—and in the phrase “‘I’ expresses a way of thinking 
of an object”, considerations of language and thought come together.  Anscombe’s target is an 
idea that holds at the level of language, and as such at the level of thought (and vice versa).  
5 Apart from the present paper, I do not know of a single example in the literature that does 
this.   
6 The learning here would be a matter of acquiring knowledge either through observation, or 
through testimony from those who themselves acquired the knowledge through observation.   
To think of the phrase “human being” as signifying a kind under which a body could in this 
manner be learned to fall would be to think of it as expressing an “empirical concept”, as 
opposed to the “non-empirical concept” that Michael Thompson thinks the same phrase must 
also express insofar as it figures in the fundamental propositions of ethical knowledge.  For 
this idea, see Thompson, 2004.   
7 Compare Evans, 1982, especially chapter 6, and Rödl, 2007, especially chapter 1.   
8 Compare Anscombe’s discussion of the private language argument, in Anscombe, 1976.   
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9 As Anscombe puts it, “we have [here] as it were an example of language possessed of an 
imagination, forcing its image upon us” (1975, p. 32).  
10 On the idea of expressing the way someone thinks of something by saying what he thinks 
of, see Evans 1981, p. 295.   
11 It may be that Evans thinks of these ways of knowing as something other than modes of 
presence to consciousness (contrary to what their names suggest).  But it is impossible to 
know, because Evans does not say what they are, in such a way as to reveal them to be 
capable of enabling NN (or anyone) to understand what he expresses with “I” as an Art des 
Gegebenseins.   
12 Exactly how to handle this idea is a matter of a dispute; for two different handlings, see on 
the one hand Byrne, 2011, and on the other Rödl, 2007.   
13 This is not to dismiss what Evans says about mental self-ascription, which could 
illuminatingly figure in a positive account of self-ascription understood in a non-Fregean 
manner (see §§29-31).  This is the best frame in which to understand, not only these remarks 
of Evans’s, but also what Anscombe says about “practical knowledge” in Anscombe, 1963.  
The first two chapters of Rödl, 2007 seek to articulate these two forms of self-consciousness: 
determining what to believe, through theoretical reasoning (Evans’s concern), and 
determining what to do, through practical reasoning (Anscombe’s concern).  Rödl is clearly 
after self-understanding—but he also makes it look as if he is discharging Evans’s orthodox 
project.  If what is said here is right, then these cannot go together.  But there is a better way 
of understanding what he is doing in these chapters.  
14 Evans, 1982, p. 209; here by an “I-identification” Evans means the way of thinking that 
constitutes knowledge of which object is being thought of that a speaker expresses with “I”.  
Unlike Evans, Rumfitt does not seek to provide for “I-identifications” in this sense.   
15 Evans encountered this worry in Nagel, 1979.  But for its most thorough presentation, see 
Nagel’s marvellous essay “The Objective Self”, in Nagel, 1986.     
16 Each comes out with some version of “I can’t be TN”, but for different reasons: in the case 
of Schopenhauer (in Schopenhauer, 1966) and Wittgenstein’s persona (in Wittgenstein, 
1961), the reasons are of the philosophical sort considered in §§9-17; in the case of Musil (in 
Musil, 1997 and Thoreau (in Thoreau, 1854) they are more sensuous in character—turning on 
a historical fact in the former case (the anomie suffered by intellectuals after the fall of the 
Austro-Hungarian empire), and a geographical fact in the latter (the emptiness felt by those 
who spend too much time alone in the woods).  
17 “If this were the only name anyone had, the situation would be worse than it is for a bank in 
a Welsh village” (Anscombe, 1975, p. 23). 
18 See Clarke, 1978.  
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19 Anscombe claims that the second of these assertions could be false—and Anthony Kenny 
worries how this could be (see Kenny, 1979).  Obviously it could not be because the one 
identified by the subject-component of the thought it expresses might be other than the one 
upon which it turns for its truth—for it expresses no such thought.  Kenny wonders whether it 
could be because the one upon which it turns for its truth might be other than the one who 
makes the assertion.  But that cannot be right either, because it would violate the rule of 
language for “I”.  The answer is that the assertion might be false because the one that it 
demonstrates—namely, “this body here”—could be other than the one who makes it. 
“[I]magination makes something of [that] idea” (Anscombe, 1975, p. 33): just picture a 
simple science fiction scenario in which the one who makes the assertion is in a control 
tower, and the one who produces the noises that (so to speak) broadcast it is on the ground, 
and “this body here” picks out the latter.  Someone who thinks that someone standing before 
her might be such a conduit could wonder as to the truth of the assertion that is being 
broadcast by the noises—for she could wonder whether the one making the assertion is “that 
body there”.   
 
